1. Has your national competition authority published guidelines on competition compliance programmes (“CCPs”)? If so, what are the key components of an effective CCP?
  2. Are there any recent cases in your jurisdiction where the NCA/competent courts have discussed the impact of CCPs?
  4. Has the role of the management and/or employees of the company been assessed with respect to preventing, participating in, detecting and reporting violations, or remediating violations? Is there a link between the role of the company's management and/or employees and an effective CCP?
  5. Has the fact that an undertaking has a CCP been helpful in reducing a fine for an infringement of competition law? What facts, arguments or commitments were used to justify the reduction and what is the maximum reduction that can be granted? If a reduction is not granted, why not?
  6. Are CCPs (their adoption or updating) used as evidence for "self-cleaning" measures when an economic operator risks being excluded from a public procurement procedure for collusive behaviour?
  7. Please indicate any additional considerations / rules, trends that are important in your country in relation to CCPs.
  8. Are there legal developments on the horizon in relation to CCPs?

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Bulgaria
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1. Has your national competition authority published guidelines on competition compliance programmes (“CCPs”)? If so, what are the key components of an effective CCP?

Yes, the Bulgarian Commission for the Protection of Competition (the “Bulgarian NCA”) issued its Guidelines on CCPs in 2012. While there is no universal model that can be applied to all companies, the Bulgarian NCA has outlined a few steps generally considered necessary when creating and implementing a CCP:

  • Individual risk analysis, including an assessment of the company‘s position on the relevant market.
  • Clear and firm management commitments, including appointing a responsible director, ensuring employee awareness, adopting specific rules and implementing internal benefits and sanctions mechanisms.
  • Establishing a clear whistleblowing channel either via a compliance officer or other means. The goal is to ensure a prompt and adequate response in the event of a potential or actual problem.
  • Implementation of an internal mechanism for cooperation with the Bulgarian NCA.
  • Regular training of the company’s employees in view of their specific job responsibilities and level of risk exposure, including ensuring that employees are aware of the whistleblowing channel.
  • Periodic reviews and assessments of the results of the programme to ensure that it reduces the chances of an infringement being committed. 

2. Are there any recent cases in your jurisdiction where the NCA/competent courts have discussed the impact of CCPs?

No relevant cases to date. 

3. What arguments have been taken into account in relation to a CCP? Has the fact that a company has a CCP been assessed in terms of the effort made or the results achieved, i.e. the efficiency of the programme? Is the focus on future changes in CCPs or on existing programmes?

In terms of CCPs, it is the result that matters. The Bulgarian NCA has stated that the only objective criterion on the effectiveness of a CCP is whether it prevents a company from committing an infringement. CCPs should be established not with the aim of reducing potential sanctions, but to create a structure within the company that would reduce the risk of committing an infringement.

Regarding changes in CCPs, the Bulgarian NCA has stated that a company’s implementation of such a programme is not a one-time event. In view of competitive, organisational or legal developments, companies should carry out periodic assessments of the CCPs and update them if needed. 

The Bulgarian NCA has stated that the attitude of the management of a company is not a prerequisite for imposing liability on the company for infringing Art. 101 or 102 TFEU (or national equivalents). Whether the management acted wilfully or negligently may be relevant only to determining the fine. The company will be liable for an infringement regardless of which company individual was involved.

In its Guidelines, the Bulgarian NCA emphasises the important role of both the company’s management and employees in the effective implementation of CCPs. It is the management’s task to integrate competition compliance into company policy and to ensure that employees understand their obligations. This commitment should be backed by concrete actions, e.g. a designated member of top management or the owner/other senior figure should be responsible for overseeing the CCP. Employees should not only be well-informed about compliance with competition laws, but also encouraged to actively participate in identifying and reporting potential violations. 

5. Has the fact that an undertaking has a CCP been helpful in reducing a fine for an infringement of competition law? What facts, arguments or commitments were used to justify the reduction and what is the maximum reduction that can be granted? If a reduction is not granted, why not?

There are no relevant cases before the Bulgarian NCA on that matter. The Bulgarian NCA states in its Guidelines on CCPs that the existence or lack of a compliance programme will not influence the amount of the fine. Sanctions are determined depending on the severity and duration of the infringement, as well as any mitigating or aggravating circumstances.

The OECD has specifically pointed out in its Competition Compliance Programmes, OECD Competition Committee Discussion Paper (2021) that Bulgaria’s competition body does not grant credit for compliance programmes. 

6. Are CCPs (their adoption or updating) used as evidence for "self-cleaning" measures when an economic operator risks being excluded from a public procurement procedure for collusive behaviour?

Neither the Bulgarian NCA’s Guidelines on CCPs nor its Guidelines on Fighting Bid-Rigging in Public Procurement [Decision № 972, dated 19.11.2020] include specific information on the connection between CCPs and public procurement procedures. Nevertheless, the Public Procurement Act allows companies with past infringements to justify their participation in a bid by providing evidence of organisational and personnel measures taken to prevent further violations, which may include CCPs. 

Despite there being no possibility of fine reductions based on having an effective CCP in place, it remains critical to nonetheless have an effective, tailored CCP to avoid potential infringements in the first place.

No legal developments are expected regarding CCPs.